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Abstract. Intelligent transportation systems (ITS)
bring advanced applications that provide innovative
services for various transportation modes in the area
of traffic control, and enable better awareness for dif-
ferent users. Communication connections between in-
telligent vehicles with the use of wireless communica-
tion standards, so called Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
(VANETs), require ensuring verification of validity of
provided services as well as services related to transmis-
sion confidentiality and integrity. The goal of this pa-
per is to analyze secure mechanisms utilised in VANET
communication within Cooperative Intelligent Trans-
portation Systems (C-ITS) with a focus on safety crit-
ical applications. The practical part of the contribu-
tion is dedicated to modelling of security properties of
VANET networks via OPNET Modeler tool extended by
the implementation of the OpenSSL library for authen-
tication protocol realisation based on digital signature
schemes. The designed models simulate a transmission
of authorised alert messages in Car-to-Car communi-
cation for several traffic scenarios with recommended
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES).
The obtained results of the throughput and delay in the
simulated network are compared for secured and no-
secured communications in dependence on the selected
digital signature schemes and the number of mobile
nodes. The OpenSSL library has also been utilised for
the comparison of time demandingness of digital signa-
ture schemes based on RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman),
DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) and ECDSA (El-
liptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) for different
key-lengths suitable for real time VANET communica-
tions for safety-critical applications of C-ITS.
Keywords
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scenarios, VANET networks.
1. Introduction
Traffic control under its constantly growing volume
cannot get along without the support of information
and communication technologies provided by the In-
telligent Transportation Systems [1]. Currently, a sig-
nificant role is played by the development of a new
generation of Cooperative Intelligent Transportation
Systems which, together with wireless communication
infrastructure, provides important information directly
to a driver in a moving vehicle [2].
C-ITS introduce a technology which allows cars to
communicate with each other or more precisely to com-
municate with the infrastructure. The reason of im-
plementing such technology is to increase safety on the
roads through raising awareness of the situation. Vehi-
cles communicate with each other and with static units
located along infrastructure by broadcasting critical
and non-critical messages. These messages can con-
tain information e.g. about location of vehicles, their
speed and the information about unusual events on the
road.
Many currently operating commercial systems of this
type work on the principle of image information analy-
sis, for example the Lane Departure Warning Systems
(LDWS) [3], [4], [5], [6], which are based on a machine
vision technology and monitor the position of a vehicle
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in the driving lane and alert the driver if the vehicle is
departing or is going to depart the track [7].
Currently the problem of integration of the offered
ITS services into a large complex is very actual [8].
While implementing these goals it is necessary to form
communication connections between intelligent vehi-
cles with the use of wireless communication standards,
so called Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), which
also requires to ensure verification of validity of the
provided services as well as the services related to the
transmission confidentiality and integrity.
The Car 2 Car Communication Consortium (C2C-
CC) [8] was established in Europe in 2004 by six Eu-
ropean car companies (Audi, BMW, DaimlerChrysler,
Fiat, Renault and Volkswagen) with the goal to cre-
ate an open standard for inter-vehicle communication
using a wireless technology (IEEE 802.11 standard).
The communication in VANETs is realised using an On
Board Unit (OBU) and a Road Side Unit (RSU). The
OBU is a transceiver/receiver operating on a principle
of Dedicated Short Radio Communications (DSRC).
Typically, it is installed inside the vehicle or on the ve-
hicle. Portable OBUs are also being considered. The
OBU can be operational while the vehicle or the per-
son is moving or is idle. The On Board Unit trans-
mits data on a single or several channels. The OBUs
installed within a vehicle communicate with the RSUs
and with other OBUs. The RSU is a short-range DSRC
transceiver/receiver (typically tens of meters) which
is installed along a road or sidewalk. It can operate
only in a stationary mode. The RSU transmits data
into the OBUs or exchanges data with the OBUs in
its communication areas. The RSU also performs a
function of an access point according to IEEE 802.11
with other DSRC functions. Several research groups
are currently participating in VANET development in
distinct projects, for example CARLINK, SeVeCom,
CAR 2 CAR, Safespot, CVIS, Watch – Over, Aktiv,
PRECIOSA, simTD etc [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14].
Generally, the applications utilising VANET can be
categorised into: traffic control applications, logis-
tics and freight traffic control, safety applications and
safety-critical applications, maintenance and opera-
tional applications. The security of C2C communica-
tion in VANET is primarily dependent on the crypto-
graphic algorithms and on the overall robustness of se-
curity mechanisms, including security protocols and or-
ganisational measures. Cryptographic algorithms and
schemes are fundamental blocks of a security solution.
The recommendations with orientation to secure ser-
vices implemented in C-ITS and its application are de-
scribed in IEEE 1609.2 [15].
The authors focus only on the safety oriented ap-
plications which require to ensure the nonrepudiation
service and freshness of message, which is in many cases
combined with the service of confidentiality and the in-
tegrity is provided by distinct cryptographic construc-
tions and must be realized in real time.
2. Principle of Message
Authentication in
Car-to-Car
Communications
Research work in the sphere of vehicular networks is
concentrated mainly on the following areas: routing
protocols, power of antennas, elimination of error rate,
control of mobility, realisation of database systems [?]
but also on the solution of security architecture on the
base of modern cryptographic constructions using PKI
(Public Key Infrastructure) and CAs (Certification Au-
thorities). The security architecture of VANET for C-
ITS consists of several elements. It is concerned with
widespread range of mechanisms located in a particu-
lar section of C-ITS. A more detailed description of it
can be found e. g. in [16].
In the contribution, we present a secure architecture
of V2V and V2I only for securing safety-related mes-
sage transmissions in safety-critical applications.
According to the chosen digital signature scheme, the
vendor assigns each node a pair of cryptographic keys,
the public and the secret vehicle key K = PKV , SKV .
These are the long-term keys. The Certification Au-
thority (CA) assigns a long-term certificate for the
public vehicle key PKV . Secret keys are stored in
the vehicle in a so called Hardware Security Module
(HSM), which at the same time provides a secure time
base when generating the time-stamps for the digital
signature. The HSM also manages all cryptographic
operations with keys. In case of threatening this sensi-
tive information they should be deleted from the HSM
module. Digital signature schemes in contrary to com-
mon commercial applications (banking systems) utilise
the pseudo-anonymous identification when authorising
messages within vehicular communication networks,
thus providing security and anonymity of the vehicle
owner. In order to obtain a pseudonym, a set of key
pairs is generated within the vehicle and public keys
are sent to the corresponding CA via a secure com-
munication channel. Then the certification authority
signs each of the public keys and generates a set of
pseudonyms for each vehicle. Each pseudonym con-
tains an identifier of the CA, lifetime of the pseudonym,
the public key and the signature of the CA, hence no
information on vehicle identity is provided [17].
The frequency of pseudonym changes depends on the
degree of the vehicle protection, input parameters (po-
sition, speed) and system settings. To ensure other
pseudonyms, so called pseudonyms sets are being used.
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These pseudonyms are periodically supplemented from
CA. In the moment, when a node transits from the
pseudonym set 1 to the pseudonym set 2, it is no longer
allowed to utilise any pseudonym from the set 1.
Before sending a safety related message a digital sig-
nature is generated in the security unit of the vehicle
V1 using its secret key SKV 1. The signature is a func-
tion of message M as well as the header H, as in the
principle depicted in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1: The transmission of authorized messages between vehi-
cles.
This way created cryptographic number is attached
to the message together with the certificate Cert, which
is coupled on the i-th anonymous sender public key
PKiV 1, which is certified by the corresponding CA.
On the side of vehicle V2, the received certificate is
validated first (if not done before) and the received
digital signature is verified using the i-th public vehicle
key PKiV 1, which is downloaded in periodic intervals
by the vehicle V2 (or other vehicles). Simultaneously,
the geo stamp information is verified from the headerH
and after these procedures the safety relevant message
is accepted or not.
The process of generation of digital signature by ve-
hicle V1 can be mathematically described as follows:
V1 → ∗ :M,H,SignSKiV 1 [(M,H) | T ] , ...
CertPKi1 ,
(1)
where: M represents the sending safety relevant mes-
sage, H represents message header, SKiV 1 is a short-
term secret vehicle key of vehicle V1 in i-th moment,
PKiV 1 is a short-term public vehicle key of vehicle V1
in i-th moment, T is a time-stamp, Cert is a short-
term certificate of vehicle V1 (for anonymous public
key PKi1), represents the number of receivers (in case
the message is sent to several vehicles).
The current certificate of vehicle V1 valid in the i-th
moment for the anonymous public vehicle key (PKi1)
contains:
CertiV 1
⌊
PKi1
⌋
=
= PKiV 1 | SignSK−CA
⌊
PKiV 1 | IDCA
⌋
,
(2)
where: SignSK−CA represents the certificate signature
of the corresponding certification authority based on
its secret key SK − CA, IDCA represents a unique
identification number of the corresponding certification
authority.
A conceptual design of security functions for vehic-
ular communications within a single node is presented
in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Conceptual secure VC view: node functionality [17].
3. Analysis of Attacks to
Car-to-Car
Communications
Before designing the security architecture of C2C us-
ing VANET, it is necessary to address the analysis of
risks which can occur during transmission of informa-
tion messages in a wireless environment. Regarding
an open transmission system, the number of network
attacks is a variable which has to be monitored be-
cause the progress in cryptographic transmission de-
velopment also implies the increase of development in
possible attacks and related cryptographic attacks. It
is necessary to consider attackers who do not attack
only outside from network side, but directly in vehicle
(inside attackers). To mention a few of them [18]:
• Denial of Service (DoS) attack: A type of attack
where the attacker either disrupts the communica-
tion channel or overloads computational resources
of the vehicle. The attack can be performed by
overloading the communication band or overload-
ing by transmitting high number of messages.
• Message manipulation: The attacker injects fake
messages into communication or holds the retrans-
mission of messages. One motivation can be send-
ing messages about road congestion and thereby
forcing other vehicles to use an alternative route
and clearing the road for the attacker. Another
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case can be faking a priority vehicle and thereby
accelerating attackers drive.
• Retransmission of messages and tunnel attack:
The attack is similar to the previous by retrans-
mitting a message after some time or in a different
place via a tunnel using an external communica-
tion channel.
• Eavesdropping: The attack is based on capturing
messages and their analysis. The attack violates
privacy.
• Privacy violation: The attacker can monitor ve-
hicles and drivers via their communication. The
attack can be based on monitoring the RF fin-
gerprint for identification and recognition of the
vehicle.
• Masking and Sybil’s attack: In masking the at-
tacker impersonates themselves as another vehicle
using fake identification, while in Sybil’s attack
they presents themselves as several vehicles. The
attacker can generate data on road congestion or
if the removal of corrupt devices is based on vot-
ing, they can vote with all fake identities for the
removal of certain vehicle from the network.
• Discovery of secret keys: The attacker can gather
secret keys from OBU or RSU. The attack is based
on memory retrieval or utilisation of side-channel.
In this example of forgery attack attackers diffuse
wrong information in the network to affect the behavior
of other drivers (e.g., to divert traffic from a given road
and thus free it for them, as illustrated in Fig. 3).
Fig. 3: Example of forgery attack [19].
4. Parameters of Efficient and
Robust Digital Signatures
Schemes for Car-to-Car
Authentication
Digital signatures are used for secure communications
in VANETs. Messages are signed with the private keys
corresponding to the current pseudonym. The mes-
sages in the schemes of digital signatures also contain
the time stamps, the sender’s clock value, geo stamps
and the sender’s coordinates at the sending time.
Currently, in the commercial sphere, following asym-
metric cryptography digital signature schemes are be-
ing utilised [20]:
• Digital signature scheme with the Rivest, Shamir,
Adleman (RSA) algorithm.
• Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with the mod-
ified El Gamal’s algorithm.
• Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) scheme
with the elliptic curve algorithm.
In the process of selection of digital signature
schemes for car-to-car messages authentications, the
following parameters are important: total message size,
size of safety message, size of cryptographic overhead,
throughput of vehicular network, number of communi-
cating vehicles, message rate and maximum tolerable
processing delay per message.
According to DSRC standard messages within
VANET communications are transmitted with a pe-
riodicity of 100 to 300 ms. From this the upper bound
on the processing time overhead TOH is defined by:
TOH = TSign (M)+
TTX (M | SIGprKV [M ]) + TV er (M) ,
(3)
where TSign (M), TTX (M | SIGprKV [M ]), TV er are
necessary durations for signage, transmission and veri-
fication of the message. Tsign (M) is the time required
for singing M , TV er is the time required for verifying
M , SignPrKv [M ] is the signature of message M from
sender V and contains the key signed by Certification
Authority and Ttx (SignPrKv [M ]) is the time required
for transmitting a signature.
An approximate comparison of key lengths (in bits)
for the most widely used patterns of digital signature
using asymmetric algorithms is introduced in Tab. 1.
A short key-length (in comparison with RSA and
DSA schemes) and the related low computational de-
mandingness predestines the ECDSA for deployment in
c© 2016 ADVANCES IN ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING 52
INFORMATION AND SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS VOLUME: 14 | NUMBER: 1 | 2016 | MARCH
Tab. 1: Comparison of key lengths for digital signature schemes.
Asymmetric algorithm Security
DSA RSA ECDSA until year
L=1024, SK=160 N=1024 n=160–223 2010
L=2048, SK=224 N=2048 n=224–255 2030
L=3072, SK=256 N=3072 n=160–233 2030
L=7680, SK=384 N=7680 n=384–511 2030
L=15360, SK=512 N=15360 n=512– more 2030
Note: L, N, n are parameters of public keys of DSA, RSA and ECDSA
devices with limited computational capacity and lim-
ited memory, which includes intelligent vehicle appli-
cations. In order to accelerate the computation (for
mathematically complex schemes utilising asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms), the tendency of integrated
schemes is pushed forward. These perform two or three
security functions in a single algorithm. This direction
has also been chosen by the researchers in the SeVe-
Com project, who recommend to use not the original,
but the modified ECDSA scheme [21].
Within the SeVeCom project, the hybrid ECDSA
scheme – Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme
(ECIES) has been selected within the digital signature
scheme implementation, which supported secure ser-
vices authentication of messages with the combination
of confidentiality and message integrity.
5. Model Realisation of an
Authentication Processor
For model realisation of an authentication processor
which simulates a part of HSM module in OBU units
within C2C communications, the authors utilised the
OPNET Modeler tool [22]. The OPNET software sup-
ports libraries written in C or C++ languages. This
enables the utilisation of distinct libraries source codes
related to security, for example the OpenSSL library.
In this work, the OpenSSL-1.0.1f version has been used
for models design.
In the OpenSSL library, we use our modified C-
code for signing messages using ECIES scheme, which
was recommended as effective cryptography scheme for
VANET applications [23].
Figure 4 shows the placement of security blocks
within the designed model. The „Authentication pro-
cessor“ block controls the entire data flow from the
source (moving vehicle) into VANET and performs se-
curity operations (encryption and digital signature us-
ing the ECIES). The „Verification processor“ block on
the receiver side (in vehicle or Road Side Unit) controls
the data flow from the network to a node and performs
the verification of received messages.
Functions performed in the authentication processor:
• Generation of hash code H-MAC (Hash – Message
Authentication Code) on the base of SHA-1 (Se-
cure Hash Alhorithm) - digest.
• Authentication of this output by the ECDSA al-
gorithm, resp. generation of digital signature -
signature.
The model of the authentication processor designed
in the process editor is shown in Fig. 4. It is a state
diagram consisting of two states St_0 and St_1.
The generation of hash code is performed in state
0 (St_0) and the digital signature is generated in
state 1 (St_1). State 0 is implicit and its output
value is a hash code (the digest variable in source
code) and return value hmac_done. The variable
hmac_done acquires value 1 in case of a success-
ful hash code generation. After getting this value,
the condition for a transition to state 1 is valid. If
this state occurs, the generated hash code is signed
and output variables signature and state are cre-
ated. The signature variable represents the signature
attached to a message and the state variable after
getting value 1 passes the condition to perform the
MAC_PACKET_HANDLE function. This func-
tion forwards the message into the next level (ARP,
wireless_lan_MAC, wlan_port), which conse-
quently sends it to VANET.
Fig. 4: Authentication processor model.
Functions performed in the verification processor:
• Generation of hash code from the message using
H-MAC – digest.
• Signature verification - verify.
The state diagram of verification processor is shown
in Fig. 5. It is composed of two states. In state 1
(St_1), the same operation is performed as in the
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authentication processor, i.e a hash code is generated
from the received message using H-MAC (SHA-1). Af-
ter generating the hash code the condition for transi-
tion into state 2 (St_2) is valid and the signature ver-
ification operation can be performed - verify. The in-
put variables of this function are the key (eckey), hash
code (digest) and the signature (signature). The re-
turn value of this function is the variable ret. In case
of value 1, the signature has been evaluated as valid
and a transition is activated, which enables to perform
the IP_PACKET_HANDLE action. This action
enables access to the message from the lower level (in
Fig. 6 denoted Internet Protocol). In case the ret
variable gets another value, the DROP_PACKET
action is performed – the signature is not valid. This
action also deletes the invalid message.
Fig. 5: Verification processor model.
Fig. 6: Implementation of security blocks at the IP layer.
For the encryption of the message, we utilised the
aes_cbc.c source code from the OpenSSL project to
create a hash code hmac.c. The source code includes
functions not only for signature generation, but also
for the verification of integrated digital scheme – the
ecdsa.h function. The source code with predefined
parameters for digital signatures operations was joint
to output data from the previous state (H_MAC out-
put, keys). For a proper operation of these subpro-
grams, it is necessary to include the used libraries
(INCLUDE) into the OPNET installation directory.
A link to these libraries has to be inserted into the
header block, not directly into the individual states.
These subprograms are able to operate within the sep-
arated signature and authentication part (with modi-
fications), but also within a single unit (see Fig. 7).
The OpenSSL project contains several predefined el-
liptic curves. A list of all available elliptic curves can
be found in [20]. For the simulation purpose, we chose
the P-384 elliptic curve, in OpenSSL denoted as fol-
lows: secp384r1: NIST/SECG curve over a 384
bit prime field. It is the elliptic curve (EC) Ep(a, b)
defined over a finite body Fp (p=384), where p is an
even prime number and represents the key length. Ac-
cording to [21], the prime number EC is more advan-
tageous for the software implementation in comparison
to EC over a finite body Fm2 or Koblitz curves.
The overall communication security model using the
ESCIS scheme is shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7: Demonstration of overall communication security model
in OPNET Modeler.
6. Obtained Results
The authors in parallel performed a comparison of time
demandingness of ECDSA scheme generation and veri-
fication in dependence on key length on simulated OBU
units.
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We created a simple simulation to demonstrate the
computational demandingness of chosen digital signa-
tures. It has been tested on a computer with Intel
Dual Core processor with frequency of 2.3 GHz. We
performed the calculations using a virtual device that
we created for this purpose using the VirtualBox soft-
ware and additional software, needed for the proper
OpenSSL operation. We focused on the ECDSA digi-
tal signatures with key length 160, 192, 224, 256, 384
and 521 bits for several types of elliptic curves (EC) on
the base prime field, binary Koblitz curve and pseu-
dorandom curves. Within the simulation, the message
with a predefined length was signed by a private key
with a measured length and the number of signatures
during the 10-second interval has been noted. Con-
sequently, the message verification using a public key
during the 10-second interval has been done.
At first, we compared demandingness of different
EC in the process of signing and verification, where
we found out that ECDSA prime field curves are
the fastest (Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b)). Next we chose
ECDSA Prime field curve and compared it to RSA,
DSA cryptographic schemes.
The obtained results of measured time of generation
and verification are presented in Tab. 2 which contains
(from the left): the algorithm name, the key length, the
number of messages signed during 10 seconds, the num-
ber of messages verified during 10 seconds, the average
time of signing of one message and the average time
of verification of one message in seconds. The graphi-
cal results for three selected digital signatures schemes
(RSA, DSA and ECDSA) are shown in Fig. 9(a)) -
generation and Fig. 9(b)) - verification.
Tab. 2: The results of measured time for generation and verifi-
cation of digital signature.
Key Private Public Sign [s] Verify [s]
RSA 512 73148 789777 0.000137 0.000013
RSA 1024 13272 254362 0.000747 0.000039
RSA 2048 2045 64246 0.004873 0.000155
RSA 4096 268 17040 0.037068 0.000574
DSA 512 74480 68644 0.000134 0.000145
DSA 1024 24869 21805 0.000401 0.000459
DSA 2048 6469 5545 0.001533 0.001802
ECDSA 160 92305 24595 0.0001 0.0004
ECDSA 192 73776 18892 0.0001 0.0005
ECDSA 224 57669 14097 0.0002 0.0007
ECDSA 256 47598 10836 0.0002 0.0009
ECDSA 384 22111 4551 0.0005 0.0022
ECDSA 521 11311 2122 0.0009 0.0047
From the obtained results we can see that the RSA
scheme is faster in the verification process, which is
important because vehicle will be signing just its own
messages, but it needs to verify messages from all ve-
hicles which are within the range. RSA is now one of
the fastest algorithms in the verification process, but
by the increase of key length during the next 30 years,
RSA starts to be slower (Fig. 10). This is one of the
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Fig. 8: Comparison of elliptic curves.
reasons why ECDSA is deployed to the VANET net-
works as a perspective cryptographic scheme.
The second reason for using ECDSA is to save the
frequency band of communication. From Fig. 11 we
can see how the frequency band is loaded when several
vehicles communicate using different size of messages.
7. Conclusion
With the development of intelligent transportation sys-
tems, it is necessary to handle the problems of trans-
mission security in the C2X applications. Several cryp-
tographic constructions have to be used; they have to
be computationally secure and fast at the same time
and do not load the VANET composed of a variable
number of moving nodes. Nowadays, the develop-
ment of integrated cryptographic schemes is being pro-
moted, including several security services. The authors
implemented a model of an authentication processor
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Fig. 9: Example of time relations in RSA, DSA, ECDSA digital
schemes.
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via OPNET Modeler which was used for generation
and verification of messages transmitted between C2C
modified ECIES cryptography construction. Using the
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Fig. 11: Message size vs. system throughput.
OpenSSL libraries, the authors analysed the perfor-
mance and time demandingness of the ECDSA scheme
for different key lengths and different shapes of ellip-
tic curves as well as a comparison of time relation of
digital signature schemes RSA, DSA and ECDSA has
been performed. For several transport scenarios for
a given number of vehicles the throughput parameter
of VANET network was determined in dependence on
message size.
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